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11. Introduction.
Recent advances in oligopoly theory have shed new light on the much-debated issue of the
links between firms’ conduct, market structure and market performance. Selten (1984)
predicted that a switch from collusive to non-collusive behaviour caused by a toughening
of cartel policy would have no adverse effect on firms’ profits in the long run, although it
would cause a decrease in the number of firms in a homogeneous-good industry. The
reason is that the number of firms in an industry is determined by a free-entry condition
which requires that net profit be driven to (almost) zero by entry irrespective of firm
conduct. This insight was confirmed by Sutton (1991, 1998) and cast within his general
theory of the determinants of market structure in exogenous sunk cost, advertising-
intensive and R&D-intensive industries.
This paper provides an econometric analysis of the impact of the intensification of
price competition following the introduction of cartel laws on firms’ profits. A unique
opportunity to study this issue is given by a ‘natural experiment’ that occurred in the UK in
the 1960s. As a result of the introduction of the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act,
restrictive agreements between firms, covering a wide range of industries, were cancelled.
This caused an intensification of price competition in many industries during the 1960s.
These can be compared to a ‘control’ group of industries which had not been subject to
agreements significantly restricting competition and were therefore not affected by the
1956 Act.
The only previous statistical analysis of the effects of the 1956 legislation on
profitability is the study by O’Brien et al. (1979). They used firm-level data taken from
company accounts for a sample of about 30 industries and found no evidence of any
significant difference in the evolution of either profitability or merger activity during the
1960s between firms in industries affected by the 1956 Act and those in industries not
affected. However, this study was subject to methodological limitations, including the use
of a rather small sample of industries and the fact that the criteria for classifying industries
across groups were somewhat dubious in a few cases.
2In this paper, I provide econometric results on the joint effect of price competition
on market structure and profitability using a comprehensive dataset on competition, explicit
criteria to classify industries according to their competitive status, and a sample that
extends over a long time period and covers the whole of manufacturing industry. My
market structure measures are the number of firms and the number of plants; this part of the
analysis complements therefore the one carried out elsewhere (Symeonidis 2000a, 2000b)
using the concentration ratio. The main advantage of using firm or plant numbers is that
data on these come from exactly the same sources as the profit data. Therefore the samples
used for the market structure regressions and the profit regressions in this paper are
identical. In addition, I will examine the effect of price competition on profits in the short
run and in the long run. I will use three different profit measures: the gross profit of the
average firm, the gross profit of the average plant, and the price-cost margin. In all cases,
these are industry-level rather than firm-level data.
The econometric results from the analysis of a panel data set of manufacturing
industries in this paper suggest that the intensification of price competition following the
1956 Act had no significant long-run effect on profits, while it had a strong negative effect
on the number of firms. Additional insight is provided by several brief case studies which
serve to illustrate in greater detail the mechanism that lies at the core of the Selten-Sutton
theoretical approach. The evidence suggests that, in long-run equilibrium and in the
absence of any institutional barriers to entry, cartels do not usually result in higher profits,
but rather they allow for excessive entry (and/or insufficient exit). The long-run effect of
cartel policy is then to reduce the number of firms rather than their profits.
2. Theoretical background.
The mechanism behind the Selten-Sutton predictions can be summarised as follows (a more
formal and detailed discussion is provided in Symeonidis 2000a, 2001). Under free entry,
the net profit of each of a number of symmetric single-plant firms must be zero (or almost
zero, taking account of the integer constraint and assuming that the number of firms is not
3very small) irrespective of firm conduct. An increase in the intensity of price competition,
caused by the introduction of cartel laws, economic integration or some other exogenous
institutional change, will cause gross profit to fall, given the initial number of firms. The
price-cost margin should also fall, since sales revenue should normally not decrease when
competition intensifies. As a result, firms will no longer be able to cover their fixed costs at
the initial free-entry equilibrium. In an exogenous sunk cost industry (i.e. an industry
without significant advertising or R&D), this will inevitably lead to mergers and exit until
the gross profit of each firm rises sufficiently to cover the fixed cost, which has remained
unchanged. Thus the number of firms (or plants) will fall, but there will be no significant
effect on firm (or plant) gross or net profit in the long run. More specifically, one would
expect profitability to decline in the short run, i.e. before any significant change in market
structure occurs, and then be restored, or partially restored, in the long run through a fall in
firm numbers.1
Clearly, these results depend on two crucial assumptions. The first is that incumbent
firms under a collusive regime cannot prevent entry of new firms into the industry, or,
more generally, that the scope for entry deterrence is not larger in a collusive equilibrium
than in a non-collusive one. If this were not the case, then a breakdown of collusion would
reduce net and gross profit and would have an ambiguous effect on the number of firms. It
                                                
1 If the integer constraint is taken into account, little can be said about the precise effect of more
intense price competition on profit without imposing more structure on the model. In the specific
model analysed by Selten (1984), both total industry net profit and plant (or firm) net profit are
more likely to increase than to decrease following a switch from a collusive to a non-collusive
regime (see also Phlips 1995, chapter 3). However, in a context where the integer constraint is the
only reason for positive net profit, this can be expected to be small in general, at least at the plant
or firm level, so any change may be difficult to identify empirically. Since there is no clear
prediction as to the direction of the change either, it seems legitimate to consider a weaker version
of the Selten result as the main testable prediction of the theory, namely that a switch of
competition regime will have no significant effect on plant (firm) gross or net profit in the long
run. Also, the effect on total industry net profit will be ambiguous, although industry gross profit
should fall because of the fall in the number of firms.
4is, in fact, possible to construct theoretical models of collusion where firms make
supranormal profits either by adopting trigger strategies that deter entry (Harrington 1989,
1991) or by adopting a strategy of gradually accommodating entry (Friedman and Thisse
1994). In such models, a decrease in the degree of collusion will reduce net and gross profit
and will have an ambiguous effect on the number of firms (assuming that the scope for
entry deterrence is smaller in a more ‘competitive’ equilibrium). Hence an empirical test of
the present theory regarding the effect of competition on profits may also be interpreted as
a test of alternative theories of collusion.
The second key assumption is the symmetry assumption. However, the typical
industry is subject to significant asymmetries, due to a variety of factors including multi-
plant or multi-product firms, or efficiency differences between firms. In the presence of
asymmetries, free entry is consistent with supranormal profits for all but the marginal firm
in an industry, and it is not clear whether any general theoretical prediction can be derived
about the long-run equilibrium effect of more price competition on the profit of the average
firm. Results from specific models suggest that the effect of tougher price competition on
firm profit and even on the price-cost margin can be positive in the presence of efficiency
differences even when no account is taken of the integer constraint (see Montagna 1995).
The intuition is that an exogenous shock that reduces prices in the short run drives the less
efficient firms out of the industry, so in long-run equilibrium price may fall by less than the
marginal cost of the average firm in the industry and thus the price-cost margin of the
average firm may rise. In other words, low-cost firms will expand at the expense of high-
cost rivals, and as low-cost firms always have higher margins in an asymmetric industry,
the possibility arises that the margin of the average firm will be higher in the new
equilibrium despite the increase in the intensity of competition. Of course, this is only a
possibility and it could also be the case that the overall effect is a fall in the margin of the
average firm. For my present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the long-run effect of
price competition on profitability is ambiguous.
5I have so far focused on the case of an exogenous sunk cost industry. Things can be
more complicated in industries with significant endogenous sunk costs such as advertising
or R&D. A change in the intensity of price competition will affect the incentive of each
firm to spend on advertising or R&D, which is part of the fixed cost incurred. As a result, it
may not always be the case that more intense price competition causes the number of firms
to fall (see Symeonidis 2000b, 2000c for a formal analysis). On the other hand, the long-
run effect on net profit will still be (approximately) zero, although gross profit may change
because of the change in advertising/R&D expenditure, and the direction of that change is
not predictable in general.
As shown in Symeonidis (2000a, 2000b, 2000c), however, any effect of price
competition on advertising or R&D is likely to be rather modest in practice, and hence the
competition-concentration relationship will only infrequently break down in advertising-
intensive or R&D-intensive industries. Thus one should not overemphasise the potential
differences across classes of industries in this respect. The same may be true for the effect
of price competition on profitability. It is not difficult to show that, under plausible
assumptions, this effect should be negative in the short run, i.e. before any change in
market structure occurs, and can be ambiguous in the long run, i.e. once market structure
adjusts, in industries with endogenous sunk costs just like in exogenous sunk cost
industries. To see this, consider two cases. Suppose, first, that price competition has no
significant effect on advertising/R&D at the industry level. Gross profit must then fall in
the short run when price competition intensifies, given that neither advertising/R&D nor
market structure have changed. The price-cost margin must also fall under the plausible
assumption that sales revenue has not decreased as a result of tougher price competition. In
the long run, both gross profit and the price-cost margin can rise or fall, depending on
market structure, total industry sales revenue and the type and degree of asymmetries
between firms. Next, suppose that price competition has a negative effect on the non-price
variable at the industry level. In the short run, gross profit (and the price-cost margin)
should decline not only because of more price competition but also because of the fall in
6advertising/R&D, which reduces the consumers’ willingness to pay. In the long run, the
effect is again ambiguous.2
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion. First, in the
presence of asymmetries between firms or endogenous sunk costs, such as advertising or
R&D, it is difficult to derive any strong theoretical results regarding the effect of price
competition on profitability in the long run. Second, the basic intuition from the benchmark
case, namely that profitability should initially decline following a rise in the intensity of
price competition, and then be restored, or partially restored, through a fall in firm
numbers, emerges as the dominant mechanism driving the joint evolution of structure and
performance across classes of industries, except perhaps for rather special cases where
price competition has a particularly strong effect on non-price variables.
3. The competition data.
As a result of the 1956 Restrictive Practices Act, explicit agreements significantly
restricting competition were abandoned across a wide range of British manufacturing
industries. A detailed description of the institutional changes and of the evolution of
competition in UK manufacturing from the 1950s to the early 1970s can be found in
Symeonidis (1998, 2001). In what follows I briefly summarise those aspects that are
particularly important for the purposes of the present paper.
The 1956 Act required the registration of restrictive agreements, including verbal or
even implied arrangements, on goods. Registered agreements should be abandoned, unless
they were successfully defended by the parties in the newly created Restrictive Practices
Court as producing benefits that outweighed the presumed detriment (or unless they were
considered by the Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements as not significantly
                                                
2 If price competition has a positive effect on the non-price variable at the industry level, these
results may change. But this case is not relevant in the present empirical context (see Symeonidis
2000b, 2001).
7affecting competition). Because the attitude of the Court could not be known until the first
cases had been heard, the large majority of industries registered their agreements rather
than dropping or secretly continuing them. The first agreements came before the Court in
1959 and were struck down. This induced most industries to voluntarily abandon their
agreements rather than incur the costs of a Court case with little hope of success. Most
agreements were cancelled between 1959 and 1963.
Many agreements provided for minimum or fixed producer prices. On the other
hand, there were typically no restrictions on media advertising or R&D expenditure. Free
entry was a key element in the theoretical discussion of the previous section, so a crucial
question is whether entry was restricted in cartelised industries. The evidence from the
agreements registered under the 1956 Act, the reports of the Monopolies and Restrictive
Practices Commission (cf. Guenault and Jackson 1974, Rowley 1966) and the case studies
in Swann et al. (1973) suggests that this was not the general case. Although practices such
as collective exclusive dealing and aggregated rebates were often used by the cartels as a
way of limiting competition from outside firms, it is not at all clear that these practices also
restricted entry. In most industries the agreements were operated within trade associations
and there were often no significant restrictions on association membership, so that entry
would not be difficult if the entrant was willing to become a party to the agreement. In
some industries, on the other hand, the existing association members might reject some
applications for membership, although they would usually accommodate (for lack of a
better alternative) any powerful non-member firm. Such restrictions would be easier in
industries where the association firms had some control over distribution channels, usually
through agreements with distributors’ associations. Even in such cases, of course, entry
would not be restricted unless the barriers to outside competition were fully effective.
Moreover, profits of firms in cartelised industries were thought to be more often
‘reasonable’ than ‘excessive’, and there were typically marked variations in costs and
profits across firms. This often meant that the profitability of the less or least efficient was
‘low’, and sometimes even negative in particular lines of production. In fact, price setting
8by the cartels often consisted in a compromise between high-cost and low-cost firms, with
prices set at a level that allowed the high-cost firms to break even. Of course, it is not clear
why cartel firms should not make excessive profits if they could defend them against entry.
The absence of excessive profits in most British cartels is consistent with a regime of non-
restricted entry.
The lack of excessive profits does not mean that the agreements were not effective.
In fact, case-study evidence (for example, Swann et al. 1973, 1974) suggests that in most
industries the agreements had been operated honourably before cancellation and outside
competition, from domestic or foreign firms, was limited. This evidence also indicates that
price competition intensified in the short run in many industries following the abolition of
cartels. However, in several cases agreements to exchange information on prices, price
changes etc replaced the former restrictive arrangements in the short run, and price
competition emerged only after these information agreements were abandoned in the mid-
1960s, i.e. about a decade after the 1956 Act was passed, following adverse decisions of
the Restrictive Practices Court. In sum, while one cannot rule out cases of ineffective
agreements or cases of collusion continuing secretly in the 1960s, the available evidence
suggests that such cases were not numerous. The majority of industries with collusive
agreements in the 1950s did experience, sooner or later, an intensification of price
competition as a result of the 1956 Act, and so it is, on the whole, legitimate to think of this
evolution as a change of competition regime induced by an exogenous institutional change.
The main source of data on competition are the agreements registered under the
1956 Act. I have also used a number of other sources to identify unregistered agreements or
agreements modified before registration, including various Monopolies Commission
reports, the Board of Trade annual reports from 1950 to 1956, and unpublished background
material for the Political and Economic Planning (1957) survey of trade associations. The
approach to modelling the competition effect in the present paper involved distinguishing
between those industries with a change of competition regime following the 1956 Act and
those without a change in regime. All industries in the sample were classified according to
9their state of competition in the 1950s on the basis of three criteria: the reliability of the
data source; the types of restrictions; and the proportion of an industry's total sales covered
by products subject to agreements and, for each product, the fraction of the UK market
covered by cartel firms.
In particular, the various types of restrictions were classified as significant, non-
significant or uncertain, according to their likely impact on competition. Next, the products
which were subject to agreements were assigned to the various industry categories. Now
certain products within a particular industry were subject to significant restrictions, while
others were not. An industry was classified as collusive in the 1950s if the products subject
to significant restrictions accounted for more than 50% of total industry sales. It was
classified as competitive if the products subject to significant or uncertain restrictions
accounted for less than 10% of industry sales. And it was classified as ambiguous in all
remaining cases.3 All industries with ambiguous state of competition in the 1950s (as well
as a few with ambiguous state of competition in the late 1960s and early 1970s) were then
excluded from the sample.
Finally, the dummy variable CHANGE was defined, which takes the value 1 for
industries with a change in competition regime sometime after 1958 and 0 for industries
without a change in regime. An analysis of the competition effect on profits and market
structure could then be performed by testing whether the time effects on these variables
                                                
3 In fact, most industries classified as competitive were free from any restrictive agreements. I have
used the 10% cut-off point because in some cases secondary industry products were subject to
restrictive agreements, although core industry products were not. Similarly, most industries
classified as collusive had agreements covering all industry products. I have used the 50% cut-off
point because in some cases most core industry products were subject to price-fixing, although
some were not; clearly, one would expect a significant impact of the 1956 Act in such cases. Small
variations in the cut-off points (in particular using 20% instead of 10%, or using 40% or 70%
instead of 50%) do not significantly affect the results reported in section 4. The use of a continuous
competition measure instead of cut-off points has proved impractical for a variety of reasons (see
Symeonidis 2001 for an extensive discussion).
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after 1958 are different for the two groups of industries in regressions that also control for
other factors that may have influenced profits and market structure during the period
examined. Data on profits and firm/plant numbers over the relevant period are available for
five different years, namely 1954, 1958, 1963, 1968 and 1973. Note that, although the Act
was introduced in 1956, it was not until 1959 that industries, on the whole, started
cancelling their agreements. Moreover, competition did not break out immediately in
several industries, so the impact of the Act was felt at least until the late 1960s or early
1970s.
4. Empirical models and results.
To study the joint effect of price competition on market structure and performance, I
estimate in this section reduced-form equations derived from the theory sketched in section
2 above. According to this theory, market structure and profits are both endogenous and
determined by the same set of exogenous variables. These include market size, the level of
setup costs or scale economies, the intensity of price competition, union power, and various
unspecified time-invariant industry-specific characteristics (such as the degree of product
differentiation or the elasticity of demand).4
Some of the theoretical predictions of this paper would be best tested using data for
net profit, i.e. gross profit minus fixed costs. Unfortunately, it is not possible to construct
measures of net profit with the data available. The capital stock figures are estimates, and,
while the estimated proportional changes in capital stock over time in any given industry
are reasonably accurate, the estimated levels should be treated with caution (see Oulton and
O’Mahony 1990). As a result, only measures of gross profit can be used. While this is a
limitation of the present analysis, it should be emphasised that the theory also provides
predictions regarding gross profit. Thus a key prediction is that industry gross profit
                                                
4 Union power is included in this list since it has often been found to have a positive effect on
profitability in empirical studies of the effects of unions, and this result is consistent with
theoretical models of firm-union bargaining.
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divided by the number of plants should not change significantly following an
intensification of price competition. This will not be true if, contrary to the present theory,
cartels generally deter entry in long-run equilibrium. Moreover, a key insight of the present
theory is that profitability should initially decline following a rise in the intensity of price
competition, and then be restored, or partially restored, through a fall in firm numbers.
Finally, if it can be shown that the long-run effect of cartel laws on the industry price-cost
margin is not significant, on the whole, across industries, then the effect on total industry
gross profit cannot be negative under the plausible assumption that industry output does not
fall as a result of more competition. Provided that total industry fixed costs do not rise as a
result of more competition (which, in a model with exogenously determined setup cost, is
equivalent to saying that the number of plants does not rise), total industry net profit will
not fall: cartel laws will be, in this case, definitely not bad for business.
The basic sample of industries for the present analysis contains 201 industries and
760 observations. As the theoretical predictions for the effect of price competition on profit
are perhaps less clear for advertising-intensive and R&D-intensive industries than for
exogenous sunk cost industries, I will also present results for a sub-sample of exogenous
sunk cost industries. The main purpose of this is to check that the results for the whole
sample are not driven by advertising-intensive or R&D-intensive industries, as this would
not be consistent with the theory. The sample of exogenous sunk cost industries was
derived from the basic sample by dropping all industries with ADS > 1% or RDS > 1%,
where ADS and RDS denote the typical or average advertising-sales ratio and R&D-sales
ratio, respectively, over the relevant period. This sample contains 134 industries and 502
observations. Industries with ambiguous state of competition in 1958 (or, in a few cases, in
the late 1960s and early 1970s) were excluded from both samples, as were industries for
which there were not at least two available observations for the period 1958-1968 (in other
words, industries with data only for 1954-1958 or 1968-1973).
Descriptive statistics on initial levels in profit and market structure measures are
presented in Table 1. In particular, the table reports means and standard deviations of five
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different variables in 1954 and 1958, for industries that experienced subsequently an
intensification of price competition as well as for industries not affected by the legislative
changes (the latter group includes a few industries where the agreements continued). The
variables are the number of firms, NFIRMS, the number of plants, NPLANTS,5 the industry
gross profit deflated by the general producer price index for all manufacturing and divided
by the number of plants, PLANTPROFIT, the deflated industry gross profit divided by the
number of firms, FIRMPROFIT, and the price-cost margin, PCM, defined as net value of
output minus wages and salaries divided by sales revenue. For the first four of these
variables a log transformation is used. The figures are based on industries with available
data for both 1954 and 1958, and can therefore also provide information on the evolution of
profits and market structure across different groups of industries before the implementation
of the 1956 legislation.
The first thing to note is that there is little difference in initial conditions between
industries affected by the 1956 Act and those in the control group, especially when one
looks at the full sample. Note that the price-cost margin is slightly higher for industries in
the control group when using the full sample, but lower when focusing on exogenous sunk
cost industries. This is partly due to the fact that advertising-intensive and R&D-intensive
industries tend to have higher price-cost margins, but they are also less likely to be
collusive than exogenous sunk cost industries. Even more interesting is the comparison of
the 1954-1958 changes in the two groups. The evolution of lnNFIRMS and lnNPLANTS is
very similar in the two groups, especially lnNFIRMS. Thus, on the basis of the raw data at
least, one could probably conclude that any differences observed after 1958 should be
attributed to the legislation rather than to any pre-existing differential trend in the two
groups.
                                                
5 A limitation of using these variables as measures of market structure is that they are sensitive to
the number of small firms (or plants). It is well known that small firms often do not produce core
industry products. This problem are somewhat alleviated by the fact that very small firms (namely,
firms with less than 25 employees) are not taken into account in my data. Other measures of market
structure, such as concentration measures, are not available for the industry categories used here.
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On the other hand, the average PCM is roughly constant between 1954 and 1958 in
industries with CHANGE = 1 but falls somewhat in industries with CHANGE = 0. The
difference is not large, at least for the full sample (about half a percentage point).
Moreover, it can be argued that, if it turns out that the average PCM has fallen during
1958-1963 in industries with a change in the intensity of competition relative to the control
group, then this must surely be the effect of the 1956 legislation, since the trend was, if
anything, exactly the opposite before 1958. I will return to these issues when discussing the
regression results below.
Table 2 presents statistics on the average change in each of the five endogenous
variables of interest over 1958-1963 and also over 1963-1968. (There are less observations
for 1973 than for 1958-1968, so descriptive statistics for 1958-1973 would be less
informative.) In both periods, lnNFIRMS and lnNPLANTS decreased considerably more, on
average, in industries with a change in competition regime than in industries without such a
change. For the period 1958-1968 as a whole, the number of firms in the former group fell
by about 45%, while it fell by only about 20% in the latter. Also, the number of plants fell
by about 25% in the former group as compared to 8% in the latter. Of course, these
comparisons do not control for changes in other variables; still, the differences between the
two groups are indeed very large.
With respect to the profit measures a different picture emerges. Consider the price-
cost margin, which is perhaps the ‘cleaner’ of the three measures, since it is not directly
affected by the changes in firm or plant numbers. The most interesting figures are those for
the whole sample. In both groups of industries the average PCM increased over 1958-1963
as well as over 1963-1968. However, during 1958-1963 the rise was larger for industries
with CHANGE = 0 by about one percentage point, while the exact opposite is the case for
1963-1968. In other words, the average PCM in industries with CHANGE = 1 fell during
1958-1963 by about one percentage point relative to the control group, but then it
recovered during 1963-1968. In exogenous sunk cost industries, on the other hand, we still
have a relative fall in PCM during 1958-1963 in industries where price competition
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intensified, but no obvious recovery during 1963-1968. Admittedly, these changes are not
large, and it is difficult to draw any conclusions on the basis of these statistics alone. To
unravel the link between changes in market structure and changes in profitability in
industries affected by the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act, I now turn to the
econometric analysis.
The specifications used here are panel data models with individual-specific effects.
This allows controlling for industry characteristics that are important for market structure
and profitability but are relatively stable over time, such as the degree of horizontal
differentiation or the elasticity of demand. Time dummies are also included among the
regressors in an attempt to control for other factors that may have influenced the evolution
of market structure and profitability over the period examined, such as changes in the tax
system in the mid-1960s that are thought to have encouraged mergers, economies of scale
in distribution and the raising of finance, the progressive opening of the British economy,
the UK government’s prices and incomes policies between 1965 and 1973, and
macroeconomic fluctuations. It is very difficult to measure these factors at the industry
level, but it is plausible to assume that their effect would have been more or less equally
realised across all industries, or, at least, that there would not be a systematic difference
between previously collusive and non-collusive industries with respect to these factors.
Of all these factors, the one whose omission from my empirical specification is the
most regrettable is the intensification of foreign competition caused by the gradual opening
of the British economy during the 1960s and 1970s. Unfortunately, it is difficult to control
for this in a more satisfactory way.6 It should be emphasised, however, that there is no
                                                
6 Ideally, one would need some measure of the extent of foreign competition for each industry
across time. Two possible candidates are the import penetration ratio and the rate of effective
protection. However, there are serious problems, theoretical and practical, with both of these
measures. Estimates of effective rates of protection are available at a high level of aggregation and
only for some years in my sample; also, they are often subject to measurement error. The import
penetration ratio, on the other hand, is a poor proxy for the extent of foreign competition, since it
cannot capture the effect of the mere threat of competitive imports, it does not take into account
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reason to think that foreign competition may have had a differential effect across the two
groups of industries, i.e. the group with CHANGE = 1 and the one with CHANGE = 0, after
1958. As pointed out in Symeonidis (1999b), there is no strong evidence of any difference
in initial conditions between the two groups with respect to foreign competition. Moreover,
although tariff reductions occurred throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, they became in
fact more pronounced after 1967, when the Kennedy Round was completed. This may be
part of the reason why Kitchin (1976) was not able to identify any overall pattern of falling
or rising effective protection between 1963 and 1968 in UK manufacturing. On the other
hand, the effect of the 1956 restrictive practices legislation was mostly realised between
1958 and 1968, i.e. before the first stage of the Kennedy round tariff cuts. Finally, there is
no evidence that changes in the level of effective protection were any different between
industries with a change in competition regime and industries in the control group, at least
between 1963 and 1968. Kitchin provides estimates of effective protection for both these
years at a level of aggregation between the two-digit and the three-digit industry level.
Effective tariff protection increased, according to these figures, in 6 out of 12 industry
groups that I could classify as having experienced a change in competition regime, and
decreased in the other 6. For industry groups that I could classify as having experienced no
change in competition regime the respective numbers were 8 and 10. In summary, it is not
unreasonable to argue (although it is very difficult to prove) that the estimated effect of the
1956 Act from my regressions in this paper is not biased by the failure to control for
foreign competition.
The basic specification for the number of firms is
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imports by domestic producers (which may not be in competition with domestic products), and it is
itself clearly endogenous. Moreover, the industrial classification used in the foreign trade statistics
during the period examined in this book has been subject to changes over time and is often difficult
to match with the one used in the Census of Production.
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and similarly for the number of plants. SS is the industry sales revenue deflated by the
general producer price index for all manufacturing and serves as a proxy for market size.7
K/L is the capital-labour ratio, a proxy for setup costs (or economies of scale). Since the
model includes industry-specific effects, one need not assume that K/L is an accurate
measure of setup cost; all that is required is that the change in K/L is an accurate measure
of the change in setup cost, an assumption which seems quite plausible. Y54, Y63, Y68 and
Y73 are time dummies for 1954, 1963, 1968 and 1973 respectively. In some regressions the
variable UNION, which represents union density, is also included, and serves as a proxy for
union power. Details on variable definition and data sources are provided in Appendix A.8
The interaction terms should pick up any differences after 1958 between industries
with a change in competition regime and industries without such a change. Thus the
coefficient on CHANGE*Y63 (CHANGE*Y68, CHANGE*Y73) measures the effect of the
1956 Act between 1958 and 1963 (1968, 1973). The benchmark year is 1958, as it is
generally accepted that the Act had little effect on competition before then. The coefficient
on CHANGE*Y54 serves as an indirect check of this presumption, as well as a check that
the evolution of market structure during 1954-1958 was not significantly different between
the two groups of industries.
                                                
7 The potential endogeneity of prices, especially in profit regressions, suggests using the general
producer price index as a deflator. In any case, using industry-specific price indices as deflators
gave broadly similar results to those reported here. Another proxy for market size with a potential
endogeneity problem, namely the net value of output deflated by the general producer price index,
also gave similar results to those reported in Tables 3-5.
8 A potential objection to including a proxy for union power among the regressors is that this
variable could be endogenous. For instance, the prospect of plant closures following an
intensification of competition might lead to a reduction of union power to the extent that it
represents a bigger threat for the welfare of workers than for that of shareholders or managers.
While this may be correct under many circumstances, it is far less obvious that the same applies to
union density, which is the proxy used here: there is no reason to expect union membership to fall
even if the bargaining power of the union decreases because of changes in the competitive
environment. Essentially, union density is seen here as a variable that picks up primarily exogenous
influences on union power.
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The estimated model for each of the three profit measures defined above is
,73*68*63*54*
73686354)/ln(lnln
10987
654321
it
ititiit
eYCHANGEYCHANGEYCHANGEYCHANGE
YYYYxKSSmeasure Profit
+++++
++++++=
γγγγ
γγγγγγα
where the ‘profit measure’ is lnPLANTPROFIT, lnFIRMPROFIT or PCM, ‘K/x’ is either
the capital stock of the average plant, K/N, or the capital-labour ratio, K/L, and the other
variables are the same as above.9 Again, UNION is sometimes also included as an
additional regressor.10
A remark on the interpretation of the capital-labour ratio in profit equations may be
in order. This variable, or the capital-output ratio, has often been used in profitability
studies to control for the fact that the endogenous variable, namely the price-cost margin or
the rate of return on capital, includes the gross return to capital. In the present study, the
capital-labour ratio is seen as a proxy for setup cost (net of resale value). This is not a real
difference, however, since the setup cost is essentially the cost of installing capital (plant
and machinery).
Note that the above specification is very different from those typically used in
‘traditional’ studies of the link between market structure and profitability (such as Cowling
and Waterson 1976). In these studies, a measure of market structure is always included as a
regressor. My specification, on the other hand, is a reduced-form equation derived from a
theoretical model in which market structure and profit are both endogenous. The model’s
predictions regarding the effect of a change in the intensity of price competition on
                                                
9 I use either one of these two proxies in regressions with the price-cost margin as dependent
variable. However, in regressions where the number of firms or plants directly enters into the
definition of the dependent variable I only use K/L, since the use of K/N would not be appropriate.
10 The denominator of PCM is sales revenue. Some studies (e.g. Hart and Morgan 1977, Conyon
and Machin 1991) have used net output as the denominator of PCM on the grounds that sales
revenue is influence by input prices, duties and subsidies, and the degree of vertical integration
within an industry. These arguments are more important for cross-section studies than for studies
using panel data. In any case, regressions using this alternative definition of PCM gave results
similar to those reported here.
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profitability depend on allowing market structure to change to restore the long-run
equilibrium. It is therefore important for testing these predictions that one does not control
for changes in market structure when specifying the profit equation. Moreover, a
simultaneous equations approach cannot be used here because it is simply very difficult to
find any variable that affects the number of firms and does not also influence profitability.
This would be difficult even with much more detailed data than the data available for the
present study. Nevertheless, the reduced-form equations can still provide important insights
on the interaction between market structure and profitability through a comparison of short-
run and long-run effects of competition, as will be shown later in this section.
Let me also point out that it is not possible to use a dynamic panel data model in the
present context. This would imply losing the observations for the exogenous variables for
the first two periods, and would amount to eliminating much of the variation picked up by
the interactions of CHANGE with the time dummies. Given that the years in the panel are
separated by periods of four or five years, however, it is not clear why there should be any
significant effect of lagged values on the endogenous variables in my regressions because
of adjustment lags or for other reasons.
A possible objection to the above specification is that some of the independent
variables may be endogenous. This is probably not a serious problem for the market size
and setup cost proxies, as the variation in these measures across industries and five-year
periods is likely to be mainly driven by the variation in the corresponding theoretical
variables.11 A more serious objection is the potential endogeneity of CHANGE. In
particular, the objection is that whatever difference one may observe in the evolution of
concentration after 1958 between industries with CHANGE = 1 and industries with
CHANGE = 0 may be to some extent due to unobserved characteristics that differ between
                                                
11 In the case of market size, an indirect check of this claim is also provided by a comparison of
results using lnSS with those using sales revenue deflated by industry-specific price indices. If
there was an endogeneity problem, one would expect the two sets of results to differ. However, the
results are in fact similar.
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the two groups of industries rather than to the 1956 legislation. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to test formally for exogeneity since there are no appropriate instruments for
CHANGE.  However, there are several reasons to believe that the potential endogeneity of
CHANGE is not a serious problem in the present context. First, Table 1 suggests that the
difference in initial conditions between industries affected by the legislation and those not
affected is not very pronounced. Second, one could argue that even if CHANGE is
influenced by certain variables that also affect concentration and are not included in the
model, these variables are more likely to be part of the industry-specific effect than of the
error term, since the large majority of industries classified as collusive in 1958 were
subject to restrictive agreements for many years before the introduction of the 1956
legislation. Such correlations between the industry-specific effects and endogenous
variables, if they exist, will not cause any econometric difficulties if an appropriate
specification is used.
Moreover, a powerful indirect check of the claim that endogeneity is probably not a
serious problem is to examine the evolution of market structure and profitability in the two
groups of industries before 1958. As pointed out above, the descriptive statistics in Table 2
provide no evidence that any differences between the two groups after 1958 could be
attributed to pre-existing differential trends. This will be confirmed by the econometric
results below: the coefficient on CHANGE*Y54 will be nowhere statistically significant,
even at the 20% level, suggesting that there was no difference in the evolution of market
structure and profitability between the two groups of industries before 1958.
The model was estimated for the whole sample as well as for the sample of
exogenous sunk cost industries and the results are presented in Tables 3-5. All the results
are for a fixed-effects specification.12 The reported standard errors are heteroskedasticity-
consistent, adjusted for small sample bias following MacKinnon and White (1985). Note
                                                
12 The Hausman test always rejects the random-effects model. In any case, the results from this
model with respect to the competition effect are similar with those obtained using fixed-effects
estimation.
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that two different R2’s are reported: the first does not include the fixed industry effects,
while the second does.
Table 3 contains regression results for lnNFIRMS and lnNPLANTS. Note that in the
regressions using the whole sample interaction variables are used to control for possible
differences between exogenous sunk cost, advertising-intensive and R&D-intensive
industries regarding the effect of market size on the number of firms or plants. In
particular, AD2*lnSS (RD2*lnSS) is equal to lnSS for industries with typical or average
advertising-sales ratio (R&D-sales ratio) over the period higher than 2% and to 0 for
industries with advertising-sales ratio (R&D-sales ratio) lower than 2%.13 The results in
Table 3 suggest that the 1956 Act had a strong and statistically significant negative effect
on the number of firms in the long run. This effect was only partly realised by 1963 and it
was mostly realised by 1968. The magnitude of the coefficient on CHANGE*Y73 implies
that the intensification of price competition following the 1956 Act reduced, on average,
the number of firms across all classes of industries by about 12-13% between 1958 and
1973. For exogenous sunk cost industries the effect was even stronger, a fall of about 15-
20%. This may understate the impact of competition to the extent that there is measurement
error in the construction of CHANGE as a result of ineffective or unregistered agreements.
The effect of competition on the number of plants was somewhat weaker: the
coefficients on CHANGE*Y68 and CHANGE*Y73 in regressions with lnNPLANTS are
negative but smaller in absolute value than the corresponding coefficients in regressions
with lnNFIRMS and usually not statistically significant at the 5% level. This implies that,
while much of the structural adjustment in British manufacturing following the 1956
                                                
13 I also experimented with alternative interaction variables, namely using 1% instead of 2% as the
cut-off point, but these were not statistically significant. In preliminary regressions, I included such
interaction variables also for the competition effect, but they were not statistically significant,
either individually or jointly. Note that whether an industry’s typical advertising-sales ratio or
R&D-sales ratio over a period of ten or twenty years is higher or lower than 2% is largely
determined by exogenous characteristics such as advertising effectiveness and technological
opportunity, so the interaction variables are not endogenous.
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legislation took the form of exit, mergers were also part of the process, and hence the
reduction in firm numbers was more pronounced than the reduction in plant numbers.
Finally, note that the coefficient on the capital-labour ratio is negative and usually
statistically significant at the 5% level in these regressions, while that on market size is
large, positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. A comparison with the
coefficients on the interaction variables AD2*lnSS and RD2*lnSS suggests that market size
has a positive effect on firm or plant numbers across classes of industries, although this
effect is less pronounced in advertising-intensive industries.14
Table 4 presents results for lnPLANTPROFIT and lnFIRMPROFIT. The first of
these variables may be the one more closely associated with the theory described in section
2. This is because the capital-labour ratio is meant to control for setup costs at the plant
level. (Note, in this respect, that the coefficient on lnK/L, which is everywhere positive and
statistically significant, is larger in the regressions with lnPLANTPROFIT.) To the extent
that the plant-to-firm ratio increases, gross profit per firm could rise relative to gross profit
per plant if there are significant economies of multi-plant operation. The results in Table 4
provide no evidence of any significant impact of the 1956 Act on the gross profit of the
average plant, which is consistent with the theory. Moreover, there is no evidence of any
significant impact of the Act on firm gross profit either.
An interesting feature of the results in Tables 3 and 4 is the magnitude of the
coefficients on the year dummies. After controlling for market size, the capital-labour ratio,
union density, the effect of cartel policy and industry effects, the number of plants or firms
in any given industry in 1973 was, on average, about 35-40% lower than in 1958; also, the
gross profit of the average plant or firm was more than 60% higher in 1973 than in 1958.
This evolution seems in several cases to have continued a trend present during 1954-1958
                                                
14 It is not surprising that differences across classes of industries with respect to the market size
effect on firm numbers are not significant. Numerous small firms in advertising-intensive and
R&D-intensive industries spend little or nothing on advertising or R&D and may even produce
secondary industry products. The endogenous sunk cost models of Sutton (1991, 1998) are not
relevant for these firms.
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as well. To some extent these high coefficients must be due to the crudeness of the setup
cost proxy used here. As K/L has been increasing across industries throughout the period, it
is correlated with the time dummies; so to the extent that K/L is only an imperfect proxy for
setup costs and these have also been increasing, their effect could be partly picked up by
the time dummies. Note, in this respect, that K/L is not statistically significant at the 5%
level in some regressions for lnFIRMS, and that in random-effects specifications its
explanatory power is considerably higher while that of the time dummies is somewhat
lower. Moreover, the time dummies may be capturing the effect of scale economies not
directly associated with the cost of plant and machinery, such as scale economies in
marketing or the raising of finance. Finally, some of the apparent explanatory power of the
time dummies may be an artefact of the unbalanced structure of the panel. Still, it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that much of the fall in firm and plant numbers during
this period was due to factors not explicitly included in the present theory. This, of course,
does not invalidate the comparison between industries affected by the 1956 Act and
industries not affected to the extent that these other factors are not correlated with the
variable CHANGE.
While the results in Table 4 are consistent with the theory, the discussion in the
previous paragraph and the fact that the overall changes in lnPLANTPROFIT and
lnFIRMPROFIT during the period examined here were probably mainly driven by the large
decrease in firm and plant numbers suggest that it is necessary to also look at other profit
measures to assess the impact of the 1956 Act on firms’ profits. A measure not directly
influenced by firm or plant numbers, such as the price-cost margin, should be particularly
useful. Table 5 reports the results. The first thing to note is that the coefficients on
CHANGE*Y68 and CHANGE*Y73 are nowhere statistically significant, even at the 10%
level. The failure to detect any long-run effect of price competition on the price-cost
margin is consistent with the theory developed in section 2 and justifies the Selten-Sutton
emphasis on the effect of firm conduct on market structure rather than on profits. Other
variables also have the expected signs and are, on the whole, statistically significant: K/L or
23
K/N has a positive effect on the profit margin, while union density has a negative effect.
The coefficient on market size is highly non-significant. The time dummies may again be
picking up some of the effect of scale economies on the price-cost margin, given that K/L
or K/N are imperfect proxies and are measured with some error.
It is also very interesting to compare the short-run and long-run impact of
competition. This is perhaps the most decisive test of the present theory, since this latter
predicts a specific link between the evolution of market structure and the evolution of
profitability in the short run and in the long run. Table 3 shows that it was between 1963
and 1968 that most of the restructuring of previously cartelised industries occurred. Also,
the overall picture from Table 5 (despite small differences between regressions) is that the
price-cost margin declined, on average, between 1958 and 1963 in these industries, before
recovering mostly during 1963-1968. Note that the coefficient on CHANGE*Y63 is
everywhere negative and typically statistically significant at the 5% or the 10% level, while
the coefficients on CHANGE*Y68 and CHANGE*Y73 are sometimes positive, sometimes
negative, and nowhere statistically significant. This is exactly the sort of link the theory
predicts between the evolution of market structure and the evolution of profitability in
previously collusive industries: a moderate effect on the number of firms by 1963, at which
date several industries were in short-run disequilibrium with reduced margins; then a
significant negative effect on firm numbers between 1963 and 1968, leading to a rise in
margins of those industries.
It should also be noted that the coefficient on CHANGE*Y63 in regressions using
PCM, although typically significant at the 5% or the 10% level, is nevertheless not large:
about one percentage point. This is consistent with the evidence provided by the descriptive
statistics of Table 2. It has to be borne in mind that only a subset of the previously
cartelised industries were in short-run disequilibrium in 1963. In several industries
competition had not yet emerged, and there must have also been many others where
competition had emerged but much of the adjustment of market structure had already taken
place. Thus the magnitude of the coefficient on CHANGE*Y63 should not be taken as a
24
measure of the fall in the price-cost margin following a change of competition regime and
prior to any adjustment of market structure; this is likely to be quite larger than one
percentage point.
Finally, it may be argued that the profit equations estimated above may
inadequately control for industry-specific factors that cause departures from long-run
equilibrium. Hence regressions were also run including the variable ∆lnSS among the
regressors, defined for industry i and year t as the change in lnSS in the five-year period
preceding year t. The coefficient of this variable was everywhere positive and sometimes
statistically significant, but the rest of the results did not change. A disadvantage of this
alternative specification is that the first-year observation for each industry cannot be used
(since ∆lnSS is then not available), and this implies dropping all 1954 observations. This is
why results have been reported here using the more restricted specification.
5. Concluding remarks.
The results of this paper support the hypothesis of a negative overall effect of the 1956 Act
on the number of firms and of no significant effect on profitability. The former result is
consistent with the finding of a positive overall impact of the Act on concentration in
Symeonidis (2000a). Moreover, the comparison of short-run and long-run effects of
competition suggests a link between changes in market structure and profitability: in the
short run, when the number of firms has not yet fallen very much, profit margins decline;
but they recover in the long run, once the number of firms falls. These results are consistent
with the theoretical framework developed here, which emphasises the effect of price
competition on market structure rather than on profitability. The results say that in long-run
equilibrium most cartels will result in excess entry rather than excess profits relative to the
absence of collusion. Legislation prohibiting cartels will therefore typically reduce the
number of firms rather than their profits.
There can be exceptions to this. Appendix B examines three case studies of the
effect of the 1956 Act on market structure and profitability in an attempt to provide
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additional insight on the present theory. While two of the case studies conform to the
overall picture suggested by the econometric analysis, the third is a counterexample of an
industry where competition caused profits to fall and had little effect on firm numbers. It is
shown that this was probably due to the violation of a key assumption of the present theory,
namely the free-entry zero-profit condition under collusion. In addition to illustrating the
limitations of the present theory, this counterexample demonstrates in a powerful way the
theory’s predictive power. In particular, the reason the theory fails in this special case is
that its key assumption fails, which essentially confirms the mechanism driving the
theoretical predictions of the present paper.
One thing that has not been much emphasised here is the fact that price-cost
margins can change for two different reasons: either because prices change or because unit
costs change. Throughout this paper I have tended to focus on changes in margins and to
play down the distinction between price and cost changes on the assumption that cost
changes are generally passed on to prices, everything else being equal. Nevertheless, I have
implicitly attributed the short-run fall in profitability in previously collusive industries to a
fall in prices caused by the abolition of price-fixing agreements. On the other hand, the
recovery of profitability in the longer term could be due to a recovery in prices or a fall in
unit costs or both. Again, I have implicitly attributed much of this recovery to price
increases following the drastic fall in the number of firms. But my results are not
inconsistent with the view that margins also increased because less efficient firms could not
survive in the more competitive conditions of the 1960s and so the unit cost of the average
firm fell. In fact, I have hinted in section 2 that such an effect could be part of the story,
and in one at least of the case studies discussed in Appendix B it probably was. The point
is, however, that any such fall in the unit cost of the average firm that is not fully passed on
to prices could not occur without the restructuring of the previously collusive industries.
Similarly, the price increases observed in the long run in several industries affected by the
1956 Act could not occur in the absence of mergers and exit.
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It may also be worth emphasising that this paper does not provide any direct test of
the free-entry zero-profit condition. What has been tested here is not whether net profit is
approximately zero in the long run for the marginal firm; this is a very difficult task
without firm-level data on profits and capital costs. What this paper has tested is whether a
change in firm conduct has any effect on profit in the short run and in the long run. Thus
the results presented here would also be consistent with a model that predicts that the net
profit of the marginal firm is consistently larger than zero by a non-trivial amount, and that
this amount is not much affected by a change in conduct. Of course, one could argue that it
is not clear what systematic mechanism could account for the existence, across industries,
of supranormal profits for the marginal firm which are relatively stable irrespective of
whether firms collude to fix prices or not. In the absence of such a mechanism, the results
presented here seem to suggest that the zero-profit condition is a valid assumption, at least
as a first approximation, for most industries characterised by free entry. Still, as pointed out
by Scherer and Ross (1990), this approximation may be indeed rough, especially for R&D-
intensive industries, where firms’ capabilities often change at a rate slower than the rate at
which technology and demand conditions shift. In such industries, and perhaps also in
others, it may be questionable whether a zero-profit equilibrium is actually achieved at any
point in time. However, it is probably safe to suggest, on the basis of the results presented
here, that in these as in almost all other industries the level of excess profits does not
depend, in the long run, on firms’ pricing conduct, because of forces such as entry and exit
that push industries towards the zero-profit equilibrium. In this sense, the free-entry zero-
profit condition stands out as a very useful approximation for the study of competition and
the determinants of market structure and profitability.
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Table 1. Initial conditions (1954, 1958) in industries affected by the 1956 Act and
in industries not affected.
Mean
(St.dev) of
lnNFIRMS
Mean
(St. dev) of
lnNPLANTS
Mean
(St. dev) of
lnPLANTPROFIT
Mean
(St. dev) of
lnFIRMPROFIT
Mean
(St.dev) of
PCM
All industries with
CHANGE = 1
(n = 55)
1954
1958
All industries with
CHANGE = 0
(n = 79)
1954
1958
4.17 (0.96)
4.06 (0.92)
4.24 (1.16)
4.10 (1.13)
4.53 (0.93)
4.47 (0.90)
4.56 (1.08)
4.43 (1.08)
4.22 (0.85)
4.29 (0.89)
4.09 (1.10)
4.20 (1.15)
4.57 (0.91)
4.70 (0.95)
4.39 (1.23)
4.51 (1.25)
0.169 (0.063)
0.170 (0.061)
0.181 (0.080)
0.175 (0.078)
Exogenous sunk
cost industries
with CHANGE = 1
(n = 45)
1954
1958
Exogenous sunk
cost industries
with CHANGE = 0
(n = 47)
1954
1958
4.20 (0.95)
4.08 (0.90)
4.55 (1.01)
4.43 (1.00)
4.54 (0.93)
4.48 (0.90)
4.86 (0.94)
4.74 (0.93)
4.05 (0.77)
4.08 (0.80)
3.65 (0.86)
3.65 (0.84)
4.39 (0.83)
4.48 (0.86)
3.95 (1.00)
3.98 (0.98)
0.168 (0.065)
0.168 (0.064)
0.156 (0.050)
0.144 (0.042)
Notes: (i) The figures are based on industries with available data for both 1954 and 1958.
The figures for lnFIRMS and lnFIRMPROFIT are based on 77 (rather than 79)
industries with CHANGE = 0 and 46 (rather than 47) exogenous sunk cost
industries with CHANGE = 0. The group of industries without change in regime
includes 8 collusive industries (7 in the exogenous sunk cost sample). n indicates
the number of industries.
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Table 2. Average change, 1958-1963 and 1963-1968, of lnNFIRMS, lnNPLANTS,
lnPLANTPROFIT, lnFIRMPROFIT and PCM.
∆lnNFIRMS ∆lnNPLANTS ∆lnPLANTPROFIT ∆lnFIRMPROFIT ∆PCM
All industries with
CHANGE = 1
(n = 62)
1958-1963
1963-1968
All industries with
CHANGE = 0
(n = 82)
1958-1963
1963-1968
-0.18
-0.20
-0.09
-0.09
-0.09
-0.15
-0.03
-0.05
0.35
0.29
0.40
0.24
0.44
0.33
0.47
0.27
0.024
0.012
0.032
0.004
Exogenous sunk
cost industries
with CHANGE = 1
(n = 52)
1958-1963
1963-1968
Exogenous sunk
cost industries
with CHANGE = 1
(n = 48)
1958-1963
1963-1968
-0.19
-0.22
-0.12
-0.11
-0.10
-0.16
-0.07
-0.08
0.35
0.28
0.43
0.23
0.44
0.33
0.48
0.26
0.024
0.011
0.033
0.012
Notes: Figures based on industries with available data for 1958, 1963 and 1968. n denotes
the number of industries.
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Table 3. Regression results for lnNFIRMS and lnNPLANTS. (Fixed effects estimation.)
Dependent variable: lnFIRMS Dependent variable: lnPLANTS
All industries ADS, RDS < 1% All industries ADS, RDS < 1%
lnSS 0.582
(0.041)
0.581
(0.041)
0.518
(0.041)
0.515
(0.040)
0.658
(0.031)
0.658
(0.031)
0.605
(0.031)
0.604
(0.031)
lnK/L -0.065
(0.047)
-0.064
(0.047)
-0.108
(0.055)
-0.110
(0.055)
-0.125
(0.041)
-0.124
(0.041)
-0.138
(0.048)
-0.138
(0.048)
UNION - -0.346
(0.293)
- -0.514
(0.381)
- -0.209
(0.226)
- -0.194
(0.286)
Y54 0.113
(0.024)
0.119
(0.025)
0.080
(0.030)
0.086
(0.030)
0.100
(0.021)
0.103
(0.024)
0.063
(0.028)
0.065
(0.029)
Y63 -0.182
(0.022)
-0.177
(0.022)
-0.191
(0.026)
-0.184
(0.026)
-0.102
(0.021)
-0.099
(0.022)
-0.114
(0.025)
-0.111
(0.025)
Y68 -0.351
(0.034)
-0.340
(0.034)
-0.321
(0.041)
-0.310
(0.040)
-0.234
(0.032)
-0.228
(0.032)
-0.226
(0.039)
-0.222
(0.038)
Y73 -0.450
(0.051)
-0.408
(0.059)
-0.401
(0.061)
-0.355
(0.067)
-0.381
(0.045)
-0.356
(0.052)
-0.319
(0.053)
-0.302
(0.056)
CHANGE*Y54 0.004
(0.040)
0.005
(0.040)
0.028
(0.045)
0.030
(0.045)
-0.054
(0.035)
-0.054
(0.035)
-0.028
(0.041)
-0.027
(0.041)
CHANGE*Y63 -0.037
(0.031)
-0.035
(0.031)
-0.021
(0.035)
-0.017
(0.035)
-0.025
(0.029)
-0.024
(0.029)
-0.014
(0.034)
-0.012
(0.033)
CHANGE*Y68 -0.095
(0.041)
-0.086
(0.043)
-0.110
(0.048)
-0.090
(0.052)
-0.063
(0.035)
-0.057
(0.036)
-0.062
(0.040)
-0.545
(0.043)
CHANGE*Y73 -0.133
(0.061)
-0.119
(0.062)
-0.190
(0.066)
-0.155
(0.071)
-0.080
(0.054)
-0.071
(0.054)
-0.128
(0.061)
-0.115
(0.064)
AD2*lnSS -0.305
(0.078)
-0.297
(0.078)
- - -0.300
(0.066)
-0.296
(0.067)
- -
RD2*lnSS 0.087
(0.081)
0.095
(0.082)
- - -0.053
(0.073)
-0.048
(0.073)
- -
R2 0.64 0.65 0.68 0.68 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
R2LSDV 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Hausman statistic
Prob-value
159.8
≈0
162.9
≈0
143.6
≈0
142.7
≈0
127.4
≈0
130.9
≈0
74.4
≈0
70.1
≈0
No. of industries
No. of industries
with CHANGE = 1
No. of observations
201
77
758
201
77
758
134
65
501
134
65
501
201
77
758
201
77
758
134
65
501
134
65
501
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4. Regression results for lnPLANTPROFIT, lnFIRMPROFIT. (Fixed effects estimation.)
Dep. variable: lnFIRMPROFIT Dep. variable: lnPLANTPROFIT
All industries ADS, RDS < 1% All industries ADS, RDS < 1%
lnSS 0.441
(0.058)
0.440
(0.058)
0.455
(0.059)
0.453
(0.058)
0.363
(0.054)
0.362
(0.054)
0.365
(0.051)
0.362
(0.050)
lnK/L 0.146
(0.055)
0.147
(0.055)
0.154
(0.065)
0.152
(0.065)
0.200
(0.052)
0.202
(0.052)
0.182
(0.059)
0.179
(0.060)
UNION - -0.532
(0.389)
- -0.446
(0.421)
- -0.638
(0.316)
- -0.767
(0.361)
Y54 -0.078
(0.036)
-0.070
(0.036)
-0.018
(0.039)
-0.012
(0.039)
-0.068
(0.035)
-0.058
(0.035)
-0.003
(0.038)
0.007
(0.037)
Y63 0.347
(0.031)
0.354
(0.031)
0.379
(0.036)
0.385
(0.036)
0.268
(0.031)
0.277
(0.030)
0.302
(0.036)
0.314
(0.036)
Y68 0.524
(0.046)
0.542
(0.046)
0.575
(0.052)
0.585
(0.051)
0.411
(0.044)
0.431
(0.044)
0.481
(0.050)
0.498
(0.049)
Y73 0.616
(0.067)
0.680
(0.070)
0.694
(0.075)
0.734
(0.077)
0.566
(0.059)
0.641
(0.066)
0.616
(0.069)
0.685
(0.074)
CHANGE*Y54 -0.043
(0.057)
-0.042
(0.057)
-0.085
(0.062)
-0.083
(0.062)
0.017
(0.054)
0.018
(0.054)
-0.026
(0.060)
-0.024
(0.059)
CHANGE*Y63 -0.014
(0.046)
-0.011
(0.046)
-0.031
(0.050)
-0.028
(0.050)
-0.026
(0.045)
-0.022
(0.045)
-0.038
(0.050)
-0.033
(0.050)
CHANGE*Y68 0.069
(0.055)
0.082
(0.057)
0.028
(0.061)
0.045
(0.065)
0.035
(0.051)
0.052
(0.051)
-0.020
(0.056)
0.009
(0.059)
CHANGE*Y73 0.092
(0.086)
0.114
(0.090)
0.115
(0.086)
0.145
(0.094)
0.012
(0.079)
0.040
(0.081)
0.035
(0.087)
0.088
(0.094)
AD2*lnSS 0.250
(0.125)
0.261
(0.125)
- - 0.242
(0.112)
0.257
(0.113)
- -
RD2*lnSS -0.232
(0.114)
-0.220
(0.115)
- - -0.096
(0.110)
-0.081
(0.111)
- -
R2 0.78 0.78 0.80 0.80 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.74
R2LSDV 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96
Hausman statistic
Prob-value
70.3
≈0
79.7
≈0
64.1
≈0
65.5
≈0
46.8
≈0
60.5
≈0
39.1
≈0
45.0
≈0
No. of industries
No. of industries
with CHANGE = 1
No. of observations
201
77
758
201
77
758
134
65
501
134
65
501
201
77
758
201
77
758
134
65
501
134
65
501
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 5. Regression results for PCM. (Fixed effects estimation.)
Dependent variable: PCM
All industries ADS, RDS < 1%
lnSS 0.008
(0.007)
0.006
(0.006)
0.008
(0.006)
0.005
(0.006)
0.004
(0.007)
0.002
(0.007)
0.003
(0.006)
0.001
(0.006)
lnK/L 0.020
(0.007)
- 0.021
(0.007)
- 0.014
(0.008)
- 0.014
(0.008)
-
lnK/N - 0.012
(0.006)
- 0.013
(0.006)
- 0.007
(0.007)
- 0.007
(0.007)
UNION - - -0.177
(0.042)
-0.176
(0.041)
- - -0.186
(0.051)
-0.188
(0.051)
Y54 0.006
(0.004)
0.005
(0.004)
0.008
(0.004)
0.008
(0.004)
0.010
(0.005)
0.009
(0.005)
0.012
(0.005)
0.011
(0.005)
Y63 0.029
(0.004)
0.030
(0.004)
0.031
(0.004)
0.033
(0.004)
0.030
(0.005)
0.032
(0.005)
0.033
(0.005)
0.034
(0.005)
Y68 0.026
(0.006)
0.030
(0.006)
0.032
(0.005)
0.035
(0.005)
0.036
(0.006)
0.040
(0.006)
0.040
(0.006)
0.043
(0.006)
Y73 0.021
(0.009)
0.030
(0.009)
0.042
(0.009)
0.050
(0.009)
0.040
(0.011)
0.046
(0.010)
0.057
(0.010)
0.062
(0.009)
CHANGE*Y54 -0.003
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.006)
-0.003
(0.006)
-0.005
(0.007)
-0.005
(0.007)
-0.005
(0.007)
-0.005
(0.007)
CHANGE*Y63 -0.012
(0.006)
-0.012
(0.006)
-0.011
(0.006)
-0.011
(0.006)
-0.011
(0.007)
-0.011
(0.007)
-0.009
(0.007)
-0.009
(0.007)
CHANGE*Y68 -0.004
(0.006)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.001
(0.007)
0.001
(0.006)
-0.010
(0.007)
-0.010
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.008)
-0.003
(0.008)
CHANGE*Y73 -0.003
(0.011)
-0.011
(0.011)
0.005
(0.011)
-0.003
(0.011)
-0.008
(0.013)
-0.014
(0.013)
0.004
(0.013)
-0.001
(0.014)
AD2*lnSS -0.013
(0.015)
-0.015
(0.015)
-0.009
(0.015)
-0.012
(0.015)
- - - -
RD2*lnSS -0.025
(0.014)
-0.026
(0.014)
-0.021
(0.014)
-0.022
(0.014)
- - - -
R2 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.36 0.35
R2LSDV 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Hausman statistic
Prob-value
29.62
0.003
29.15
0.004
39.58
0.0002
37.52
0.0004
19.82
0.03
17.73
0.06
28.94
0.002
26.56
0.005
No. of industries
No. of industries
with CHANGE = 1
No. of observations
201
77
760
201
77
758
201
77
760
201
77
758
134
65
502
134
65
501
134
65
502
134
65
501
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
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APPENDIX A
The industry definitions used in this paper are sometimes at the three-digit level of
aggregation and sometimes at the four-digit level. In particular, in most cases they are the
‘principal products’ within any three-digit ‘minimum list heading’ (MLH) industry, as
defined in the individual industry reports of the UK Census of Production. Whenever a
MLH industry is not further subdivided in the Census reports, it was used as the industry
definition for this chapter. Because of changes over time in the Census industry or principal
product definitions, the panel is unbalanced.
Information on competition was taken from the agreements registered under the
1956 Act, the various reports of the Monopolies Commission, the 1955 Monopolies
Commission report on collective discrimination, the 1949 report of the Lloyds’ Committee
on resale price maintenance, industry studies contained in Burn (1958) and Hart et al.
(1973), the Board of Trade annual reports from 1950 to 1956, and the Political and
Economic Planning (1957) survey of trade associations (including unpublished background
material for this survey).
Data on gross and net output at current net producer prices, wages and salaries, firm
numbers, and plant numbers were obtained from the industry reports of the Census of
Production (various years) and from 1973 Business Monitors. The figures are for all firms
employing at least 25 persons. Certain figures were adjusted to ensure comparability over
time. A series of general producer price indices was obtained from the Annual Abstract of
Statistics.
Industry gross profit is defined as the net value of output minus wages and salaries,
and therefore includes fixed costs, such as capital costs, advertising expenditure and R&D
expenditure. Unfortunately, it also includes some variable costs, the most important of
which are employers’ contributions to National Insurance, pension funds, etc. Data on
these are not available for most years, and the implicit assumption has been made that these
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costs are more or less homogeneous across industries and are therefore picked up by time
effects.
Estimates of capital stock, defined as plant and machinery, are available from
O’Mahony and Oulton (1990) at the three-digit level of aggregation, i.e. for Census MLH
industries. These are net stock estimates constructed on the assumption of fixed and ‘short’
asset lives and exponential depreciation rates. Given that these figures are at the three-digit
level of aggregation, there were two ways to proceed. One was to simply use the three-digit
K/L or K/N on the assumption that changes in these variables over time should be roughly
similar for all four-digit industries within any given three-digit industry. An alternative
procedure was to adjust the capital stock estimates on the basis of Census data on the
fraction of investment on plant and machinery accounted for by each ‘principal product’
within any given three-digit MLH industry. A very simple adjustment was applied in this
paper: the three-digit industry capital stock was in each case multiplied by the ratio of
principal product investment to MLH industry investment, averaged over two years. These
estimates of capital stock were then matched with employment data or with data on plant
numbers at the same level of aggregation. Both the investment figures and the employment
figures were taken from the Census industry reports. Small corrections were made to some
of these figures to ensure comparability over time.
The adjustment applied here to the capital stock figures is admittedly rough.
However, it should produce reasonable approximations of capital stock, or at least of
changes in capital stock, at the four-digit level. As it turned out, the regression results were
largely similar whether I used the three-digit industry estimates of K/L or K/N or my more
refined four-digit industry estimates of K/L or K/N derived using the procedure outlined
above. The only significant difference between the two sets of results was that the use of
the adjusted data resulted in larger coefficients and t-statistics on the setup cost proxies
themselves. This suggested (i) that the adjustment was in the right direction, and (ii) that
any further refinement of the capital stock estimates would not affect the results for the
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variables of interest, namely those capturing the competition effect. The results reported in
section 4 are those obtained using the adjusted capital stock data.
Union density is defined as the number of unionised employees over the total
number of employees. Data on this variable for the period examined here are available at a
level of aggregation between the two-digit and the three-digit level and were taken from
Bain and Price (1980).
Finally, the procedure for constructing ADS and RDS was essentially the same as in
Symeonidis (2000a); see that paper for details and a listing of the sources used. The only
complication was the generally low advertising-sales ratios for 1954, sometimes even for
industries with high advertising intensity in later years. As the 1954 advertising levels were
often not typical, I largely ignored them and used mostly the values of ADS during the
period 1958-1968 (or 1958-1973 whenever relevant) to classify the industries according to
their typical advertising intensity.
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APPENDIX B
Several of the case studies of the effect of the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act
analysed in Swann et al. (1973) provide evidence that is consistent with the theory
described in this paper. Admittedly, the evidence is somewhat sketchy, as these case
studies were not meant to test any specific hypothesis about the effects of the 1956 Act.
Moreover, it is not always easy to separate the effect of competition from the influence of
other factors on profitability and market structure in the industries examined. Nevertheless,
a brief description of the evolution of some of the industries in the Swann et al. sample
between the late 1950s and the early 1970s may be useful in providing a better
understanding of the kinds of effects that I have tried to identify across industries using
econometric analysis in this paper. Two of the best-documented cases are the transformer
industry and the glass container industry.
The details on the operation of collusive arrangements in the electrical power
transformer industry during the 1950s became widely known even before the
implementation of the 1956 Act, since the industry was the subject of a Monopolies
Commission inquiry in the mid-1950s, together with other subdivisions of the heavy
electrical machinery industry (see Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission
1957). Subsequently, the industry registered its agreements and even defended the most
important of these in the Restrictive Practices Court, where it was struck down in early
1961. This agreement covered the home market and related to all but the smallest sizes of
transformers. It provided for common minimum net selling prices, the reporting of
enquiries and orders received from customers, and aggregated rebates, i.e. discounts to
buyers on the basis of the total quantity purchased by firms who were parties. These firms
were members of the Transformer Makers’ Association, which had always included all the
producers of very large transformers. However, there was some competition from a few
outside firms for large, as opposed to very large, transformers, as well as significant
competition from outside firms for smaller equipment. It is therefore not surprising that the
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Monopolies Commission found that the profitability of Association firms was lower for the
smaller sizes of transformers than for the larger sizes. On the whole, profitability was
higher than the average for all manufacturing, but not excessive, according to the
Commission. The membership of the Association declined somewhat in the late 1950s, so
outside competition may have been stronger in 1961 than at the time of the Monopolies
Commission’s investigation.
Collusion among members of the Association had been effective during the 1950s,
and competition was slow to emerge after the agreement was formally abandoned
following the judgement of the Court. Explicit price-fixing was replaced by the exchange
of information on prices and tenders, and this helped to sustain prices and margins for
several years, despite occasional price-cutting (see Swann et al. 1973). Interestingly, many
firms who were not members of the Association at the time of the Court hearing seem to
have also adhered to the implicit arrangements after 1961. Eventually, however,
competition was triggered by a combination of events, the most important of which may
have been a significant fall in demand after 1964. A second factor was the decision of the
Restrictive Practices Court to strike down two information agreements in other industries
on the grounds that they had the same effect as explicit price fixing. A third factor was a
more aggressive purchasing policy on the part of certain buyers. As a result, prices fell by
as much as 25-40% between 1964 and 1968, according to figures reported by Swann et al.,
while costs slightly increased during the same period. The price fall was more pronounced
for medium-sized transformers than for very large equipment.
The main response of the industry to this substantial decline in prices and profits
was merger and exit. The evolution of market structure in transformers was, of course,
closely linked to developments in other markets for heavy electrical equipment, all of
which experienced an intensification of price competition during the 1960s. But nowhere
was the change in market structure so pronounced as in transformers. According to figures
based on the Census of Production, the five-firm sales concentration ratio in the industry,
which had actually fallen from 50% in 1958 to 45% in 1963, jumped to 76.7% in 1968, an
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increase of over 30 percentage points in five years. Admittedly, this was probably a case of
overshooting, as suggested by the fact that subsequently the five-firm concentration ratio
declined slightly, and was 68.8% in 1975.
By 1968, then, the industry was much more concentrated than in the early 1960s or
even in 1964, the date when prices started falling. Did prices start to rise again in the late
1960s, as would be predicted by the present theory? The answer is that they did, and indeed
quite sharply. The evidence reported by Swann et al. suggests that prices started to rise in
1969 and were higher in 1971 than in 1963. In fact, price rises of up to 50% were reported
for 1969-1970 and also for 1970-1971, a fact attributed by industry experts to the
elimination of excess capacity through merger and exit.
The experience of the glass container industry has much in common with that of the
electrical power transformer industry. As in the case of transformers, collusion had a long
history in the glass container industry and had been facilitated during the 1950s by the
steady and moderate growth in demand. The agreement among producers of glass
containers came before the Restrictive Practices Court in 1961 and was defended by the
parties. Under the agreement, the members of the British Bottle Association, who were
responsible for about 80% of the total UK production of glass containers, had to observe
common minimum prices and standard conditions of sale, and also offered aggregated
rebates to distributors. Competition from outside producers of glass containers was weak,
as several non-members sold only to specific buyers and/or tacitly observed the
Association prices. However, there was also competition from producers of containers of
different materials, such as paper, tin and plastic, and this had been on the increase at the
time the case was heard in the Court.
Swann et al. (1973) report that price competition emerged in the industry soon after
the explicit price-fixing agreement was condemned by the Court, despite an attempt to
sustain collusion through the operation of an information agreement. Unlike the
transformer industry, however, there were no spectacular price falls in glass containers,
possibly because demand fluctuations were not very pronounced. Moreover, the price falls
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that occurred are somewhat difficult to interpret because the cost of materials seems also to
have fallen during the first half of the 1960s. The clearest indication of a change in
competition regime is therefore the decline in profitability in the industry in the first half of
the 1960s, as documented in Swann et al. on the basis of data from company reports. The
largest firm in the industry experienced a continuous decline in its rate of return to capital,
which fell from 18% in 1960 to 5.8% in 1965. For other firms the evidence is somewhat
mixed as far as the entire period 1960-1969 is concerned, but for all of them profitability
clearly declined over 1962-1964, i.e. in the first few years after the emergence of price
competition. However, profitability recovered in the mid-1960s. And although the evidence
provided by Swann et al. on the profitability of various firms in the second half of the
1960s is rather sketchy, the overall picture is one of sustained moderate profitability for the
industry as a whole. At the same time, prices in early 1969 were at roughly the same level
as in late 1965, although wages and costs of materials were rising throughout this period.
Why did the rate of return on capital recover in the mid-1960s, and how was it then
sustained despite increases in input prices that were not fully passed on to selling prices?
The answer is probably twofold. First, technical progress in the industry led to
increased efficiency during the 1960s and helped to keep unit cost low despite increases in
input prices. Second, the recovery and subsequent stability of profits must have been
related to the restructuring of the industry, which was partly realised through a series of
mergers beginning in 1962 and continuing until the late 1960s. Thus, according to data
from the Census of Production, the five-firm sales concentration ratio in glass containers
increased from about 63.5% in 1958 to 69.5% in 1963, and then further to 87.3% in 1968, a
rise of nearly 20 percentage points in five years.
The two case studies briefly described above provide support for the theoretical
predictions of the present paper and are consistent with the econometric results. The next
case is a counterexample. In one sense, this third case also confirms the theory, albeit in a
different way than the two previous cases. In particular, the evolution of the secondary
battery industry from the late 1950s to the early 1970s illustrates a case where the
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predictions of this paper are not confirmed by the facts precisely because a key assumption
of the theory, namely the assumption of free entry under the collusive regime, is violated.
The secondary battery industry was investigated by the Monopolies Commission in
the early-1960s in the context of the Commission’s inquiry into various classes of electrical
equipment for vehicles (see Monopolies Commission 1963). Detailed information on the
evolution of the industry in the 1950s and the 1960s can therefore be drawn both from the
Commission’s report and from Swann et al. (1973). Sales of secondary batteries fall into
one of four main types: automotive batteries sold as initial equipment, automotive batteries
sold for replacement, traction batteries sold as initial equipment, and traction batteries sold
for replacement. The structure of the industry has always been characterised by a relatively
high degree of concentration, especially in the initial equipment market, which has been
dominated throughout the 1950s and the 1960s by the two leading firms, Lucas and
Chloride. In the case of automotive replacement batteries, several smaller firms have also
been active, and their market share increased during the second half of the 1950s, as we
will see below. Overall, the combined market share of Lucas and Chloride was around 70%
of total industry sales revenue in 1960.
These two firms were the most prominent members of the British Starter Battery
Association, which also included two smaller firms. A number of other firms remained
outside the Association, either because they chose to do so or because they were refused
membership. The agreement between the members related to replacement batteries for
motor vehicles and provided for common list prices, common discounts for various classes
of buyers, as well as restrictions on the relationships between manufacturers and buyers.
These latter provisions are of considerable interest for our present purposes. There were
several classes of buyers, but a key distinction was between ‘service agents’ and other
types of buyers. Each of the four Association members had its own network of service
agents, who could only buy from that particular manufacturer. Their names, addresses and
total number had to be reported to the Association, and no transfer of an agent from one
manufacturer to another could take place without the consent of both Association members
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concerned. In addition, the member firms could sell directly to wholesalers, retailers, or
fleet operators; there were no individual exclusive dealing arrangements for these classes
of buyers, but there was collective exclusive dealing. In other words, these buyers were
required to deal only with Association firms if they were to be supplied at all.
In addition to the agreement on replacement batteries, there was a tacit
understanding between Lucas and Chloride that they would not canvass each other’s
customers in the automotive initial equipment market. Regarding traction batteries, there
were occasional discussions on prices between Chloride and the only two other significant
producers of this type of battery.
The arrangements on initial equipment and traction batteries were presumably
terminated when the 1956 Act was introduced and were never registered. On the other
hand, the agreement of the British Starter Battery Association was modified before
registration, possibly in an attempt to make it more acceptable to the Court. Two were the
main changes: the abandonment of common list prices, and the abolition of collective
exclusive dealing. However, the revised agreement provided for maximum trade discounts,
and retained the individual exclusive dealing arrangements with ‘service agents’.
According to Swann et al., the abolition of collective exclusive dealing had a significant
impact on the structure of the industry, since smaller firms that had previously found it
difficult to enter the industry or expand due to the lack of distribution outlets could now
emerge as legitimate competitors in the replacement market. As a result, the combined
market share of non-Association firms in the replacement battery market doubled within a
few years to reach approximately 50% by the mid-1960s.
In 1960 this revised agreement was abandoned and replaced by an information
agreement. Soon after that, the Monopolies Commission began its investigation of the
industry. The principal conclusions of the Commission’s report regarding the secondary
battery industry were that competition was muted and that the two leading firms, especially
Lucas, enjoyed excessive profits, although these mainly came from initial equipment and
traction batteries, not from automotive replacement batteries. The Commission thought that
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resale price maintenance and the operation of the information agreement had contributed to
restricting competition in the industry, and recommended that they be abandoned. The
information agreement was indeed abandoned shortly afterwards, while resale price
maintenance continued for a few years before being dropped as a consequence of the 1964
Resale Prices Act.
The existing evidence on prices and profits indicates that by the mid-1960s
competition had increased in the industry and that this trend continued in subsequent years.
In fact, Swann et al. argue that the market power of the leading firms was already being
eroded in the early 1960s due to competition from smaller producers of cheap batteries.
Between 1963 and 1970, prices of a leading manufacturer only increased by about 20%
while the cost of materials more than doubled. In addition, the large producers had to
introduce cheaper ranges to protect their market share against smaller firms. According to
Swann et al., a key factor in this evolution was the ability of the firms to increase their
efficiency and hence reduce unit costs through technical improvements and better
organisation. Still, there is little doubt that profit margins fell. Although profit data are not
readily available, the report of the National Board of Prices and Incomes on prices of
secondary batteries (see NBPI 1968) clearly states that the profitability of the larger firms
was by no means excessive in 1968, and that the increase in the cost of materials during
that year could not be absorbed without an increase in prices.
While price-cost margins have apparently kept falling during the 1960s, there has
been no significant change in market structure. No major mergers or exits of important
firms had occurred in the industry by 1970. According to the Census of Production, the
number of domestic producers of automotive batteries (which is the major product of the
industry) employing at least 25 persons fell from 15 in 1958 to 11 in 1963, and then
increased to 16 in 1968, on the background of a moderate overall growth in demand during
this period. This number is probably driven by the entry and exit of smaller firms.
Unfortunately, separate concentration data for this industry are not available. However, the
concentration ratio for the battery industry as a whole, including primary and secondary
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batteries, increased by about 6 percentage points between 1958 and 1968. This is slightly
less than the average for all manufacturing (8 percentage points), and is consistent with the
conclusion that the 1956 Act did not have a major effect on market structure in the
secondary battery industry.
In summary, the industry experienced during the 1960s an intensification of price
competition, a fall in margins (with no subsequent recovery), and no significant change in
market structure. What explains this evolution, which is so different from that of the
transformer industry or the glass container industry or indeed several other industries
affected by the restrictive practices legislation? The answer is certainly not to be found in
any substantial fall in endogenous sunk costs. Both advertising and R&D were moderate in
this industry, namely of the order of 1%, and, moreover, did not change very much during
the 1960s. Rather the answer has to do with the initial conditions in the industry, and
particularly the existing barriers to entry. In the replacement battery market, the system of
collective exclusive dealing seems to have acted as a barrier to entry of smaller firms. Its
abolition in the late 1950s completely changed the nature of competition in the industry. As
for the initial equipment market, the market power of the two leading firms had been based
both on their ability to offer better products as well as to the existence of long-standing
relationships between the battery producers and the car manufacturers. These were
relationships that the battery firms were unwilling to undermine.
The econometric results of this paper suggest that the experience of the secondary
battery industry was exceptional among industries affected by the 1956 Act and cannot
therefore undermine the key assumptions of the theory set out in the introduction to this
chapter. In fact, it can even be regarded as a counterexample that essentially confirms the
mechanism driving the theoretical predictions of this paper.
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